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Changes in population age structure have led to growth in per capita income substantially 
higher than growth in output per worker in the US (Cutler and et al. 1990), East Asia 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998; Mason 2001b), Egypt (Bloom and Canning 2003), and in 
many other countries around the world (Kelley and Schmidt 2001; Mason and Lee 2004).  
This has occurred in large part because changes in age structure lead to a divergence 
between population growth and growth of the working age population. Unfortunately, the 
phenomenon is beginning to work in reverse in Japan and many European countries.  
Inevitably other countries will find that their working age populations are growing more 
slowly (or shrinking more rapidly) than their total populations.  As this occurs, the 
demographic dividend may become a demographic burden depressing per capita income 
growth relative to growth in labor productivity.  
Relatively little is known about who benefits from the demographic dividend and 
who is likely to suffer if population aging turns the dividend into a burden.  Yet, this is an 
important issue.  First, changes in age structure may have important and persistent effects 
on generational differences in income depending on the response of public and familial 
transfer systems.  Second, whether the demographic dividend will have lasting favorable 
effects may depend on whether it leads to increased human and physical capital formation.  
This may be more likely to occur if the young are disproportionately favored by the 
dividend.  Third, the welfare implications of the dividend, and the lower fertility that 
underlies it, depend on to whom the benefits flow.  If favorable demographics lead to 
higher per capita income among families that have reduced their childbearing, no 
spillovers are associated with the bonus.  If, on the other hand, the dividend is shared more 
broadly the positive or negative spillovers associated with fertility decline will be more 
important.  
  Who gains from the demographic dividend depends to a great extent on how 
changes in age structure influence transfers from those in their economically productive 
ages to those who are not.  Young dependents rely almost exclusively on transfers from 
their parents and, to a lesser extent, public transfers to meet their material needs.  In 
contrast, elderly dependents have more varied sources of support.  In traditional societies, 
they may rely on familial transfers and their own continuing work effort.  In modern 
economies, public transfer systems and lifecycle saving are more important.
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1 For a formal and comprehensive approach to transfers and saving in a lifecycle context see (Lee 1994; Lee 
2000)     2 
  Figure 1, based on 1998 data for Taiwan described in more detail below, illustrates 
the importance of intergenerational reallocations of income across age groups that underlie 
the analysis presented here.  The age profile of mean earnings for Taiwan is typical of 
many countries with earnings concentrated in the working ages of 20-65.  Per capita 
income varies much less across age than earnings because the young receive transfers and 
because the old receive transfers and have non-labor income.
2   
 
Figure 1. Average earnings and per capita household income by age (1998, Taiwan $) 
 
  The importance of age structure is immediately obvious from Figure 1.  The two 
age profiles would be impossible if there were equal numbers in each age group – the 
profile of per capita income could not possibly be so high unless non-labor income was 
much higher than it is in Taiwan.  But in 1998, Taiwan had a very favorable age 
distribution.  About 31% were under age 20 and 10% were over age 65 while 59% were in 
the working ages 20-65.  Thus a very high income profile was consistent with the 
prevailing earnings profile.  Given the age earnings profile, the effect of population aging 
in Taiwan is also clear – either non-labor income must increase substantially or per capita 
income must decline.   
What is entirely unclear is the ages that will experience the greatest declines.  Nor 
can we rule out the possibility that per capita income for some age groups will actually 
increase at the expense of further declines in other age groups.   
To address this issue we propose a model that emphasizes intergenerational 
transfers and de-emphasizes saving responses.  We draw an important distinction between 
the effects of changes in population age structure and familial age structure.  The reason 
for doing so is that public transfers are influenced by population age structure while 
familial transfers are influenced by the age structure of the family.  In the analysis, the 
separate effects of population and family age structure are obtained by distinguishing what 
we call family cohorts.   
The model is estimated using age-specific data from annual income and 
expenditure surveys conducted in Taiwan between 1978 and 1998.  Taiwan’s experience is 
instructive because it experienced such rapid fertility decline and significant and favorable 
changes in age structure over the twenty-one year period analyzed.  Like many other 
countries, however, Taiwan will experience rapid population aging in the coming decades 
with unfavorable implications for per capita income. 
Subject to qualifications discussed in more detail below, the analysis leads to the 
following conclusions.  First, changes in age structure had a favorable effect.  The 
demographic dividend raised per capita income by about 50% between 1978 and 1998.  All 
age groups did not share equally in the gains.  Second, generational differences in income 
per capita changed, in part, because of changes in the intergenerational differences in 
earnings.  If transfers were governed by effective altruism, we would not expect this to be 
the case.  Third, generational differences in income are influenced both by population age 
structure and by family age structure.  The per capita incomes of children and young adults 
are adversely affected by an increase in the population dependency ratio and by an increase 
in the family dependency ratio.  As a result, they benefited the most from the favorable 
                                                 
2 Per capita household income is the mean of the per capita income of households in which persons aged a 
live.  Household income is equally shared among all household members.     3 
changes in age structure during the 1980s and 1990s.  In contrast, the per capita income of 
the elderly does not appear to have been influenced by family age structure and was 
somewhat less affected by changes in population age structure.  As a result, they benefited 
less from demographic change in the past.  Fourth, demographics conditions have greatly 
favored some birth cohorts over others.  The 1978 cohort is the most favored with an 
average per capita income about 20% higher than that of the 1949 birth cohort and 30% 
higher than projected for the 2014 birth cohort.  Fifth, population aging will adversely 
influence growth in per capita income in the coming decades.  We predict that, on average, 
per capita income growth will be lower in the future because of changes in age structure.  
This does not mean that per capita income will decline.  If productivity increases continue 
at the pace consistent with the 1978-98 period, per capita income will increase at an annual 
rate of about 5.6% per year during the 1999-2030 period.  Five-year-olds will experience 
growth of 4.5% as compared with 5.8% for sixty-five-year-olds.     
 
   
I.  Age-Structure, Transfers, and Per Capita Income 
 
Labor income is taken as given in the analysis and forecasts of per capita income are 
conditioned on growth in output per worker.  Per capita income can diverge from labor 
income both because of transfers and non-labor factor income.  In this section, however, 
we assume a consumption-loan economy in which all non-labor income is zero.
3    
Thus, the divergence of per capita labor income from earnings is modeled here as 
the outcome of intergenerational transfers, i.e.,  
  ()()()
l yayaa t =+   (1) 
where  () ya is per capita income of persons aged a,  ()
l ya  is labor income of persons aged 
a, and  () a t  is net transfers to persons aged a.   
  Changes in age structure affect both public and private transfers.  Consider first 
public transfers.  Public transfers are subject to a social budget constraint:  public transfers 
must sum to zero.  Designating the average net transfer for the population in the dependent 
age groups as  ()
g D t  and the average net transfer for the population in the non-dependent 
age groups as  (~)
g D t : 
 
~ (~)()
gDgD DNDN tt -=   (2) 
 where 
D N  is the population in the dependent age groups and 
~D N  is the population in the 
non-dependent age groups.  Rearranging terms yields the relationship between transfers 












=   (3) 
An increase in the dependent population must lead to a rise in the average net public 
transfer paid by the non-dependent population and a corresponding decline in y(~D); or, a 
decline in the average net public transfer received by the dependent population and a 
corresponding decline in y(D); or both.  The social budget constraint does not rule out the 
                                                 
3The empirical model estimated below does not distinguish transfers from non-labor income.  Thus, to the 
extent that changes in age structure influence either, they are captured by the empirical model.     4 
possibility that an increase in the dependency ratio will lead to an expansion of transfer 
programs, i.e., an increase in the average transfer payment to members of the dependent 
population (Razin, Sadka et al. 2002).  If this happens, then the tax burden on members of 
the non-dependent population will be even greater by virtue of the upward shift in the 
dependency ratio.   
Several previous studies have addressed the relationship between age structure and 
public transfers.  Preston (1984) argues that an increase in the size and political power of 
the elderly population has led to a rise in transfers to the elderly accounting for a 
substantial improvements in their relative economic status.  In contrast, Becker and 
Murphy (1988) argue that the rise in public pensions in the US is part of an 
intergenerational contract.  Elderly are receiving larger public pensions as repayment for 
the greater investment they made in public education programs.  Recent work by Bommier, 
Lee, and Miller (2004) calls into question the Becker and Murphy interpretation of US 
experience, but if Becker and Murphy are correct then an increase in old age dependency 
has not led to greater transfers to the elderly.  Gruber and Wise (2001) provide recent 
empirical work that is relevant to the issue.  Their analysis of OECD data concludes that 
population aging has led to a decline in average transfers to the elderly and a rise in 
average tax payments by the non-elderly.  The costs of higher dependency are being shared 
by workers and retirees.   
  To summarize, an increase in the population dependency ratio must lead to a 
decline in the per capita income of one or more age groups.  If public transfers are 
governed by generational politics, an increase in the dependency may lead to an increase in 
the per capita income of population age group with larger numbers.  If public transfers are 
influenced by altruism, then it is more likely that all age groups will experience declining 
per capita income.   
  Even if changes in population age structure lead to important changes in the age 
profile of public transfer programs, the effect on per capita income may be neutralized in 
part or entirely by familial transfers.  If prime age earners act as effective altruists with 
regard to their family members, redistributions from changes in public transfers will have 
no effect on the distribution of consumption.  Public transfers induce an offsetting change 
in familial transfers.  Thus, an increase in the population dependency ratio may lead to a 
decline in the per capita income of all age groups even if public transfer programs change 
in a way favorable to one group over another.   
  The effect of age structure on familial transfers is by no means limited to responses 
to shifts in public transfers.  Families and family transfers are subject to their own budget 
constraint.  Net familial transfers, defined as transfers within the family, must also sum to 
zero.  Thus, an increase in the dependency ratio within the family must lead to a decline in 
the average familial transfer received by dependents or an increase in the average familial 
transfer made by non-dependent family members.  Likewise, the income of dependent 
family members or non-dependent family members must decline with a rise in the family 
dependency ratio.   
To say more about the response of familial transfers to changes in age structure 
requires a behavioral model of the family.  There are competing models of family transfers 
and extensive empirical evidence based on micro-level surveys.  The theoretical models 
that have guided research on the determinants of transfers reflect the diverse roles of the 
family.   Altruism and efficiency concerns are both at work in economic models of family   5 
transfers (Becker and Tomes 1976; Becker and Murphy 1988).  Effective altruists allocate 
resources across the family – investing in human capital, smoothing over the lifecycle and 
across uncertain states of the world – meeting both efficiency and distributional objectives.  
Lillard and Willis (1997) provide a succinct summary of competing models.  The old age 
security hypothesis posits that children are the old age security plan for parents.  In 
countries with under-developed capital markets, accumulating financial wealth is not a 
viable option.  As capital markets improve, parents can rely more on saving and less on 
children (Willis 1980).  The parental repayment hypothesis emphasizes constraints on 
borrowing to invest in human capital rather than deficiencies in capital markets.  Efficient 
investment in human capital is achieved only if children can “borrow” from their parents.  
Depending on the extent of altruism, an implicit contract may exist that requires children to 
repay their parents (Becker and Tomes 1976).  If the family insures members against risk, 
inter vivos transfers will arise when members face bouts of unemployment.  Protection 
against longevity risk will lead to bequests by elderly who die at a young age and support 
by children for elderly who live longer than expected (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981).   
  An alternative or perhaps complementary approach to family transfers emphasizes 
the exchange motive.  Transfers of money between parents and children may be implicit 
payments for services provided.  Children may provide personal care to elderly parents 
with failing health.  Grandparents may provide childcare services and receive 
“compensation” from their children (Cox 1987).   As is clear from Samuelson’s (1958) 
seminal work, however, exchange cannot satisfy the lifecycle problems that are under 
consideration here.  
It is empirically difficult to distinguish alternative models of transfers.  Motivations 
underlying transfers vary from one setting to the next, and transfers often fill a multiplicity 
of purposes.  In studies of inter-household transfers in Malaysia and Indonesia, no single 
model explains transfers.  The evidence there points to exchange, insurance, and 
repayments for educational “loans” as important motives for transfers (Lillard and Willis 
1997; Frankenberg, Lillard et al. 2002).  Inter-generational transfer arrangements in 
Taiwan are consistent with a variety of interpretations but not the use of bequests to 
enforce old age support (Lee, Parish et al. 1994).  Altonji et al. (2000) conclude that in the 
US money transfers respond to income difference and appear to be motivated by altruism 
rather than by implicit exchange.  Time flows from children to parents are not 
accompanied by money flows from parents to children.  However, the very low 
responsiveness of transfers to inter-generational income differences is at odds with the 
standard altruism model (Altonji, Hayashi et al. 1992; Altonji, Hayashi et al. 2000).   
 
The Model  
 
The paper employs a model, the overlapping families (OLF) model, which allows the 
analysis of intergenerational familial effects using age- or cohort-specific aggregate data. 
The model allows us to analyze independent effects of the family dependency ratio and 
population dependency ratio.  The population and family dependency ratios may differ 
substantially at any point in time for two reasons.  First, extended families are subject to 
age or lifecycle effects.  Over the lifecycle families have periods of high dependency when 
relatively few family members are in the working ages and period of low dependency 
when relatively more family members are in the working ages (Chayanov 1966).  Second,   6 
the demographic transition produces important cohort effects.  During periods of fertility 
decline (given child mortality) the youth dependency ratio will decline for successive 
cohorts.
4  Thus, the family dependency structure will vary across cohorts while the 
population dependency structure will be the same for all cohorts at any point in time.   
The OLF model treats families in a highly stylized manner.  A family is a kin-
group, who may or may not share a residence, consisting of 3 generations: workers, their 
children, and the workers pro rata share of their parents, called pensioners. We assume 
that all individuals are born to persons of age g, the generation length.  Thus, families with 
workers aged a, have children aged a-g and pensioners aged a+g.  A family cohort consists 
of all workers born in the same year, a, and their family members.  Two family cohorts are 
shown in Figure 2: the family cohort that consists of workers aged 30-34, pensioners aged 
60-64, and children aged 0-4 and the family cohort consisting of workers aged 45-49, 
pensioners 75-79, and children 15-19. Although the model is represented using five-year 
age groups, any age grouping can be used in principle.  
 
Figure 2. Overlapping Families Model  
 
  The distinction between the population dependency ratio and the family 
dependency ratio is readily illustrated using the OLF model.  In Figure 3 we show the 
population dependency ratios and the family dependency ratios for three family cohorts 
based on a generation length of 30 years. The 0-30-60 cohort consists of families 
consisting of newborns, thirty-year-olds, and sixty-year-olds in each year.  The 10-40-70 
and 20-50-80 cohorts are similarly defined.  Thus, the family dependency ratios are 
dependency ratios within each family cohort. There are striking differences between the 
population dependency ratios and the family dependency ratios.  In particular, the child 
population dependency ratio declined rapidly and smoothly during the historical period.  
The family child dependency ratio for the 10-40-70 families increased between 1978 and 
1986 and then declined very rapidly.  The decline in the family child dependency ratios for 
the 0-30-60 and 20-50-80 families were much more gradual.   
 
  Figure 3. Projected population and family dependency ratios 
 
We normalize on the number of workers per family, so that the number of workers 
per family is equal to 1. For families with workers aged a, children per family is equal to 
n(a-g,t) and pensioners per family is equal to n(a+g,t).  The variable n(a-g,t) is the ratio of 
the population aged a-g to the population aged a (the family child dependency ratio) and 
n(a+g,t) is defined as the ratio of the population aged a+g to the population aged a (the 
family old-age dependency ratio).   
Consider a simple consumption-transfer model.  In each period consumption by the 
family is constrained by the labor earnings of the family’s members and net public 
transfers.  There is no saving.   Thus, per capita income and consumption are equivalent.  
As an accounting convenience, public transfers are assumed to flow to and from the 
worker generation, although the size of the transfer may depend on the age composition of 
the family.  Familial transfers, which flow to and from the worker generation and 
                                                 
4 If there are important changes in the timing of fertility (tempo effects), cohort fertility will decline more 
slowly or more rapidly than period measures of fertility.   7 
dependent generations (children and retirees), provide the means by which any distribution 
of consumption can be obtained.  The consumption of each dependent generation is equal 
to that generation’s labor income and its net familial transfers.  The consumption of the 
worker generation is equal to its labor earnings plus net public transfers plus net familial 
transfers.  Suppose that per capita consumption of each generation is determined by an 
altruistic family utility function. 
 























  (5) 
 
where  (,)
l yxt  is the per capita labor income of persons aged x, c(x,t) is per capita 
consumption of persons aged x,  (,)
p xt t  is the net public transfer to households with 
workers aged x, and  (,)
f xt t  is the net familial transfer to individuals aged x.
5   
  Net public transfers received by the household are exogenous to the family 
decision-making process, but depend on the composition of the household, the effects of 





















i t%  is the per capita net public transfer payment to generation i (children, workers, 
or retirees) and  1() DRt is the ratio of the children to workers in the population and  2() DRt 
is the ratio of retirees to workers in the population.    
Suppose that the bundles of goods consumed by children, workers, and pensioners 
do not differ in their composition, so that changes in relative prices do not influence the 
family’s allocation problem.  If this is the case, then the share of the family’s budget 
consumed by children, workers, and pensioners (w) will be affected only by total family 
income,  (,),
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5 Positive transfers are receipts and negative transfers are payments.   8 
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From equations (7), (8) and (9), the social budget constraint on public transfers, and 
relaxing the altruism assumption, the reduced form of the per capita income by age for 
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  The earnings of dependent generations r elative to the generation of the worker 
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Thus, per capita income of any generation depends on the earnings of workers, the 
earnings of children and pensioners relative to workers, and child and old-age family 
dependency ratios and the child and old-age population dependency ratios.  
We can elaborate several hypotheses from equation (11). Some of the following 
hypotheses are linked to each other. Thus, if one hypothesis is rejected, then it affects the 
other hypothesis. However, we can still compare the size of the effects across generations 
because the measures of independent variables are identical across all three regressions.  
First, in a true consumption-loan economy  111 ,, and  abg  may not all be greater 
than 1 given r1 and r2.  One generation can gain relative to its earnings only at the expense 
of another generation’s loss.  If preferences are homothetic and effective altruism governs 
transfers, then these coefficients would not be significantly different from 1, and age 
structure will be independent of the generational distribution of income.  The existence of 
non-labor income adds additional complications.  If growth in earnings is associated with a 
change in the relative importance of non-labor income, then per capita income for any age 
group may grow more rapidly or more slowly than labor income.      9 
Second, if the family is altruistic, then the income of each generation will be 
independent of their share of family earnings contributed by members of that generation. 
That is, given effective altruism, we expect  232323 ;;. aabbgg ===  Homothetic 
preferences and effective altruism together imply that the coefficients are all zero. If the 
results are inconsistent with the pure altruism hypothesis, then the magnitude of these 
coefficients will depend on the degree of altruism governing transfers.  
Third, if preferences are homothetic and the family is altruistic, then changes in 
family age structure are neutral with respect to the generational distribution of income. In 
this case, we would expect  444555  and  abgabg ==== , and that all will be negative. If 
either altruism or homothetic preferences fails, then the income effect of dependency will 
differ across generations, although at least one coefficient must be negative due to the 
familial budget constraint.  
Fourth, there is only an income effect associated with changes in public transfers 
induced by an increase in the population dependency ratio.  Given the social budget 
constraint, an increase in either the youth dependency ratio or the old age dependency ratio 
must produce a decline in per capita income given per capita earnings.  Thus, the 
coefficients of the population dependency ratio will be negative.  If altruism holds and 
tastes are homothetic, all generations will experience an equivalent percentage decline in 
their incomes with an increase in the population dependency ratio, i.e., 
666777  and  abgabg ==== .    
 
II.  Empirical Analysis 
   
Although the major emphasis of this paper is methodological, the analysis of income 
growth in Taiwan is of interest in its own right.  Taiwan has experienced rapid 
demographic and economic change. Life expectancy at birth increased from roughly 25 in 
1900 to 78 for females and 72 for males in 1999.  The total fertility rate declined from over 
6 births per woman in the 1950s to replacement level by 1984. The age structure has 
changed rapidly. Since 1960 Taiwan’s economy has been among the most dynamic in the 
world. How demographic change has affected economic growth and transfer systems in 
Taiwan could be an important development policy issue. 
 
Data for Empirical Analysis 
 
The values of all variables that compose the synthetic panel are constructed from the 
Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan (FIES), also known as the Survey of 
Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan until 1993.  The number of household surveyed 
has varied over time, but the sample size is more than sufficient for our purposes.  In 1998, 
about 0.4 percent of all households (14,031 households and 52,610 individuals) were 
interviewed.  These are not panel data, but repeated cross-sections. 
The data set consists of mean values for single-year family cohorts for 21 
consecutive years.  The generation length g is set to 30 years.  This estimate is based on the 
difference in the average age of different generations observed in the sample.  The   10 
generation length is quite stable across time for family cohorts under the age of 50.
6  Thus, 
the data consists of 30 family cohorts for each year consisting of workers aged 30-59, their 
children aged 0-29, and seniors aged 60-89.  Those aged 90 and older are included with the 
89-year-old pensioners.  Thus, the data set consists of 21 years times 30 age groups, 
yielding 630 observations.  The oldest members were born in 1891 and the youngest in 
1998, but for these two groups we have only one observation.  Family cohorts with 
workers born near the middle of the span of birth years covered (1955) can be tracked over 
the entire 21-year span of the data. 
An attractive feature of the FIES is that each component of household income is 
assigned to members of the household.  Although there is a residual category for income 
that cannot be assigned to an individual, this category is rarely used.  Consequently, we 
can calculate earnings, defined as wages plus two thirds of business income, separately for 
each generation by age.  Per capita household income is estimated for each household 
member by allocating total current disposable income equally among all household 
members.  Average earnings and per capita income by age are estimated using sample 
weights. 
The family dependency ratios in Figure 3 are obviously noisy measure of true 
family dependency ratio in part because the generation gap is not exactly 30 years and it 
differs by household. To diminish the potential bias from this problem, we use a five-age 
moving average to measure family dependency ratios. Thus, the number of observations 
decreases to 546. 
The source of information for population forecasting is the Projection of the 
Population of Taiwan conducted by the Taiwan Council for Economic Planning and 
Development. The data includes Taiwan population projection between 1951 and 2101. 




Regression estimates for the per capita income of each generation are reported in Table 1. 
All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. We include the combined 
population dependency ratio instead of distinguishing the child dependency ratio and the 
old age dependency ratio due to the extremely high correlation between these two variables 
(r=0.990). The modified Durbin-Watson test statistics implies that we may not include a 
trend variable in the model. All estimates in this paper were obtained using the consistent 
variance-covariance matrix estimator of White (1980). The standard errors are thus robust 
to heteroscedasticity. 
The coefficient of the log earnings of workers (lnearn) captures the effect of 
general increases in earnings because the ratios of worker earnings to children and 
pensioner earnings are controlled. The coefficients of the log earnings of workers are 
positive and significant at 1 percent level for all regressions.  The larger coefficient for the 
worker generation (g2) implies that earnings growth leads to an increased concentration of 
per capita income in the worker generation.  The lnearn coefficient for the worker 
                                                 
6 For older cohorts the age difference declines due to the effects of mortality on the survival of pensioners 
leading to an underestimate of the generation length. 
7 Although we focus on our income forecast during 1978-2030, we do need the projection data of 1951-1977 
and 2031-2101 to construct the lifetime income by birth cohorts.   11 
generation, however, is not significantly different than that for the pensioner generation.  
That the coefficients are significantly less than one suggests that the share of non-labor 
income has increased over time.   
 
Table 1. Regression results, log of per capita income, Taiwan, 1978-98. 
 
The coefficients of the earnings ratios between generations (r1 and r2) are positive 
for all regressions and they are also statistically significant. If the earnings of the child 
generation increase, holding the earnings of other generations constant, the per capita 
incomes of all generations increase.  Likewise, if the earnings of the pensioner generation 
increase, all generations enjoy an increase in their per capita incomes.  This supports a 
weak form of altruism.  However, the distribution of per capita income is by no means 
entirely independent of the distribution of earnings.  Any change always favors the 
generation experiencing a relative increase in its own income.  Thus, we reject the pure 
effective altruism hypothesis. 
An interesting feature of the results is that transfers do not favor adjacent 
generations.  The pensioner generation gains as much as the worker generation from an 
increase in the earnings of the child generation.  Likewise, the gain for the child generation 
is not significantly different from the gain for the worker generation resulting from an 
increase in the earnings of the pension generation.   
The estimated effects of age structure are consistent with social and familial budget 
constraints.  An increase in any dependency ratio must lead to a decline in the per capita 
income of one of the generations.  An increase in the family child dependency ratio leads 
to a significant decline in the per capita income of the child generation; an increase in the 
family old-age dependency ratio leads to a significant decline in the per capita income of 
the child and worker generations; an increase in the population dependency ratio leads to a 
significant decline in the per capita income of all three generations.  Other effects are 
statistically insignificant.   
The estimated effects of age structure vary substantially across generation.  In 
particular, the pensioner generation appears to be less susceptible to changes in age 
structure.  Their per capita incomes are not affected by changes in the family dependency 
ratios. The estimated effect of the population dependency ratio is somewhat less than for 
the other generations, although the difference is not statistically significant.  This suggests 
that the pensioner generation gained less from the favorable changes in age structure that 
have occurred in Taiwan and that they will suffer less from the unfavorable changes on the 
horizon.  The counterfactual analysis presented below confirms that this is the case.   
In contrast, the per capita incomes of the child and worker generations are more 
sensitive to changes in age structure.  Children were the only generation to benefit from a 
decline in the familial child dependency ratio, although the effects of the population 
dependency ratio are much stronger.   
A surprising feature of the results is the strength of the population dependency ratio 
relative to the familial dependency ratio.  As discussed above, the familial dependency 
ratio should have a stronger effect on per capita income when transfers are primarily 
familial whereas the population dependency ratio may have a stronger effect when 
transfers are primarily public.  Given the importance of family transfers to children, our 
expectation was that family age structure would have a much more important effect than   12 
population age structure for the per capita income of the child generation.  The child 
generation is the only generation for which the family child dependency ratio is negative, 
however the population dependency ratio has a much stronger effect.  It is unclear exactly 
what mechanism would lead to this result.   
Even in the case of the pensioner generation, the strength of the population 
dependency ratio and the weakness of the familial dependency ratios are surprising.  A 
high percentage of the elderly in Taiwan still co-reside with their children.  Public transfers 
have increased in recent years, but are a much smaller share of the incomes of the 
pensioner generation than would be the case in the US, Europe, or many Latin American 
countries.   
It may be that a more refined measure of the familial dependency ratios than the 
ones used here would lead to larger estimated effects.  This is an issue that warrants further 
attention in future research.    
Counter-Factual Analysis 
 
The historical implications for transfers of changes in earnings and aging are assessed 
using simulation techniques. We construct a series of counter-factual simulations that 
allow dependency structures to change in accordance with their observed historical trend 
while holding all other variables constant at their 1998 levels. Using the coefficient 
estimates reported in Table 1 we calculate how per capita income would have evolved 
given the counter-factual values. All calculations employ the observed values by single 
years of age for the year in which the calculations are being made.  Results for selected 
ages are presented in Table 2. 
The combined effect of changes in age structure on per capita income between 
1978 and 1998 were very substantial in Taiwan.  The increase in per capita income due to 
changes in age-structure (A+B+C) ranged from 38.5% for 35-year-olds to 50.1% for five-
year-olds.  The effect was a substantial share of the total increase in per capita income in 
Taiwan during the entire period (column E).  Demographic change accounted for between 
13.8 percent and 20.9 percent of all economic growth.  The effects are somewhat smaller 
than other estimates of the demographic bonus (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Mason 
2001a), however the estimates are robust to slight changes in the definition of income and 
specification. 
 
Table 2. Counterfactual analysis of effects of age structure on per capita income, 
earnings held constant at 1998 values. 
 
The dominance of the population dependency ratio as compared with the familial 
dependency ratio is clear from the counterfactual analysis.  The familial child dependency 
ratio had a negligible effect for ages reported in Table 2 except for five-year-olds.  The rise 
in the familial old-age dependency ratio has a modest negative effect for the non-elderly – 
reducing per capita income by about 10% over a twenty year period.  The negative impact 
of the old-age family dependency ratio was overwhelmed by the favorable effect of the 
population dependency ratio.   
 
Forecasting Income by Age   13 
 
We use the empirical results for forecasting income until 2030. Obviously our forecast 
belongs to the regression based econometric models rather than time-series based models. 
The usual problem of the regression based econometric models is that we need to know the 
future values of independent variables. In this paper, we focus on conditional forecasts in 
which the value on future population structure is given. Thus, although the forecast 
involves unconditional forecasting elements, we are mostly interested in the effect of the 
population structure on per capita income contingent on knowing the future population 
structure. 
Based on the projected dependency structure, we simulate the net effects of 
changes in dependency structure on per capita income allowing dependency structures to 
change while controlling the other variables to hold constant at 1998 level. Regression 
estimates are again used to forecast what per capita income would be by birth cohort if 
only population structure changes.  
Table 3 documents the total effect of all dependency ratios up to year 2030 by age 
and by birth cohort. One follows a birth cohort over time by moving horizontally across 
columns within the same row. One follows the same age group over time by moving 
downward along a diagonal. Within cohort, income changes over time are attributable to 
age effects. In contrasts, changes in income within an age group are due to cohort effects. 
Because all other variables are held constant at 1998 level, there is no time effect resulting 
from productivity changes. 
The table suggests that demographic dividend varies substantially by age. For 
example, the log income of age 0 (the bottom diagonal) decreases from 12.39 in 2011-20 
to 12.07 in 2021-30 when population aging turns the dividend into a burden. However, the 
decrease for age 90 (the top diagonal) is much less, from 12.66 to 12.52. Likewise, the 
effect of change in dependency ratios is not neutral across birth cohort. The log income of 
1991-2000 birth cohort increases from 12.31 to 12.61 as they move from age 0 to age 10. 
But the log income of 2001-10 birth cohort changes little (12.62 to 12.63) for the same 
changes in age. 
 
Table 3. Counterfactual analysis of the effects of age and year of birth on log of per 
capita income. 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the effect of all dependency ratios by age over time. The 
figure indicates that child generations will suffer most when population aging turns the 
dividend into a burden and that pensioners will suffer least from population aging. 
 
Figure 4. Counterfactual analysis: demographic dividend by age (1978-2030) 
 
 Which birth cohort benefits the most from changes in age structure? To answer the 
question, we use predicted values of income at each age for cohorts born between 1949 and 
2014 holding all other variables constant.
8   To construct population and family 
                                                 
8 Predicted values are available only for ages 2-27, 32-57, and 62-87 because of our reliance on five-year 
moving averages of family dependency ratios.  Thus, the counter-factual values are simple averages for these 
age groups.  The earliest birth cohort for which predicted values at all included ages can be obtain is the 1949   14 
dependency ratios we use a population projection for 1951 to 2101 provided by the Taiwan 
Council for Economic Planning and Development. Figures 5 presents the results – the log 
of income averaged over the available ages for each birth cohort.   Figure 5 indicates that it 
is people born between 1974 and 1983 who benefit most from demographic change. The 
1978 cohort is most favored with an average per capita income about 20% higher than that 
of the 1949 birth cohort and 30% higher than the 2014 birth cohort. The adverse effects of 
demographics among future generations are felt by cohorts born after 2004.  Relative to the 
1949 birth cohort, the demographic dividend is entirely dissipated by 2008.   
 
Figure 5. Counterfactual analysis: mean of log income by birth cohort (1949-2012) 
 
  Although mortality decline made an important contribution to the changes in age 
structure that underlie the demographic dividend, the precipitating event was fertility 
decline.  Of particular policy interest then is whether the gains in per capita income 
accrued to those who decided to have fewer children or to someone else?  A comparison of 
the gains charted in Figure 5 to Taiwan’s total fertility rate (TFR) sheds light on this issue.   
Roughly speaking, the greatest beneficiaries were members of the first low-fertility 
birth cohorts – the children of those who chose to have lower fertility.  Their advantage 
relative to their parents is that they experienced low child dependency, both in their 
families and in their population, throughout their entire lives.  Their parents, on the other 
hand, experienced high child dependency during their childhood and low child dependency 
only as workers and pensioners.  Because both generations had few children, they both will 
experience elevated old-age dependency ratios when they become pensioners.  The 
continued dissipation of the dividend in Figure 5 reflects continued improvements in life 
expectancy and the consequent rise in the proportion of the population at older ages.   
  Based on the regression results, we also forecast the log per capita income by age 
allowing productivity to increase. We predict log earnings using year, age and age squared. 
The relative income variables, r1 and r2, exhibit irregular trends that are implausible for 
some ages.  Consequently, we assume that the ratios of earnings by generation (r1 and r2) 
are fixed at the average of 1978-1998 level. The forecasts are also conditioned on the 
projected population age structure. Figure 6 presents the results. If productivity increases 
continue at the pace consistent with the 1978-98 period, per capita income will increase at 
an annual rate of about 5.6% per year during the 1999-2030 period.  Five-year-olds will 
experience growth of 4.5% as compared with 4.9% for thirty five-year-old and 5.8% for 
sixty-five-year-olds. Twenty-year-olds will experience growth of 5.6% as compared with 
5.8% for fifty-year-olds and 6.0% for eighty-year-olds.  
 
Figure 6. Forecasts of log income by age (1978-2030) 
 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
birth cohort which was age 2 in 1951.  The latest birth cohort for which calculations are possible is the 2014 
birth cohort that would have been 87 in 2101.     15 
Previous studies of the effects of age structure on income do not consider the possibility 
that effects differ by age group.  If public transfer programs are influenced by age structure 
– and available evidence suggests this to be the case – then it seems likely that gains and 
losses associated with the demographic transition may be shifted across age groups, 
protecting some and burdening others.  The public sector is not, however, the only force at 
play.  In many countries, families play an important role in allocating income across 
generations or age groups.  One possibility is that they will neutralize intergenerational 
transfers undertaken by the public sector as suggested by Barro (1974).  But in many 
societies, the public sector plays a relatively modest role – particularly with regard to 
children, but also with respect to the elderly.   
Family transfers may be influenced by the family’s age structure in ways that are 
very similar to the ways that public transfers are influenced by population age structure.  
For either unit, changes in age structure can lead to tighter or more relaxed budget 
constraints.  However, at any point in time the demographic situation for families will 
differ from those for the population.  This is true because families have a demographic 
lifecycle with favorable demographics at some ages and less favorable demographics at 
others.  It is also true because families alive at the same time have different demographic 
experiences.  Especially in a country with rapid demographic change, completed family 
size can vary considerably from one cohort to the next.   
An integrated analysis of population and family-level age effects is not common in 
the literature because it seems to involve different levels of analysis.  The overlapping 
families (OLF) model proposed here offers one approach to dealing with the problem.  The 
model relies on a highly stylized view of the family.  One way to improve on the research 
presented here would be to refine the way in which the family is modeled within the OLF 
framework.   
The empirical results in the paper lead to several interesting conclusions.  First, 
both population age structure and family age structure influence per capita income.  
Population age structure, however, has a much stronger effect than family age structure.  
This result seems surprising to us, especially for a society like Taiwan’s, and warrants 
further attention.  Second, the analysis provides support for only a weak form of altruism.  
Increased earnings among members of one generation lead to higher incomes for members 
of other generations.  A surprise here is that adjacent generations do not benefit more than 
non-adjacent generations.  If the earnings of pensioners decline, for example, the incomes 
of workers and children are adversely affected by roughly equal amounts.   
Who gained from the demographic dividend?  The biggest winners were members 
of the first low-fertility generation – not the parents who first chose to have low fertility.  
The parents did gain, but by less than their children.  The policy implications of this 
depend to an extent on one’s view of the world.  If the gains were to the children of those 
who decided to have lower fertility and parents are altruistic towards their children, then 
gains to children were captured by their parents.  The empirical work presented here casts 
doubt on this view in two ways.  First, the empirical analysis supports only a weak form of 
altruism.  Second, the population dependency ratios have much greater force than the 
family dependency ratios.  This suggests social reallocations of the gains from fertility 
decline that limit the extent to which they are captured by those who opt to have fewer 
children.  
   16 
References 
 
Altonji, J. G., F. Hayashi, et al. (1992). "Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? 
Direct Evidence Using Micro Data." American Economic Review 82(5): 1177-98. 
Altonji, J. G., F. Hayashi, et al. (2000). The Effects of Income and Wealth on Time and 
Money Transfers between Parents and Children. Sharing the Wealth: Demographic 
Change and Economic Transfers between Generations. A. Mason and G. Tapinos. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 306-357. 
Barro, R. J. (1974). "Are Government Bonds Net Worth?" Journal of Political Economy 
82(6): 1095-117. 
Becker, G. S. and K. M. Murphy (1988). "The Family and the State." Journal of Law & 
Economics XXXI(April): 1-18. 
Becker, G. S. and N. Tomes (1976). "Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of 
Children." Journal of Political Economy 84(4 pt. 2): S143-62. 
Bloom, D. E. and D. Canning (2003). "From demographic lift to economic lift-off: the case 
of Egypt." Applied Population and Policy 1(1): 15-24. 
Bloom, D. E. and J. G. Williamson (1998). "Demographic Transitions and Economic 
Miracles in Emerging Asia." World Bank Economic Review 12(3): 419-56. 
Bommier, A., R. Lee, et al. (2004). The Development of Public Transfers in the US: 
Historical Generational Accounts for Education, Social Security, and Medicare. 
Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Boston, MA. 
Chayanov, A. V. (1966). The Theory of Peasant Economy. Homewood, Il, Irwin. 
Cox, D. (1987). "Motives for Private Income Transfers." Journal of Political Economy 95: 
508-46. 
Cutler, D. M. and et al. (1990). An Aging Society: Opportunity or Challenge?, Mit. 
Frankenberg, E., L. A. Lillard, et al. (2002). "Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers in 
Southeast Asia." Journal of Marriage and the Family 64(August): 627-41. 
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (2001). "An International Perspective on Policies for an Aging 
Society." NBER Working Papers W8103. 
Kelley, A. C. and R. M. Schmidt (2001). Economic and Demographic Change: A 
Synthesis of Models, Findings, and Perspectives. Population Matters: Demographic 
Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. N. Birdsall, A. 
C. Kelley and S. W. Sinding. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 67-105. 
Kotlikoff, L. J. and A. Spivak (1981). "The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market." 
Journal of Political Economy 89(2): 372-91. 
Lee, R. D. (1994). The Formal Demography of Population Aging, Transfers, and the 
Economic Life Cycle. Demography of Aging. L. G. Martin and S. H. Preston. 
Washington, D.C., National Academy Press: 8-49. 
Lee, R. D. (2000). Intergenerational Transfers and the Economic Life Cycle: A Cross-
cultural Perspective. Sharing the Wealth: Demographic Change and Economic 
Transfers between Generations. A. Mason and G. Tapinos. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 17-56. 
Lee, Y.-J., W. L. Parish, et al. (1994). "Sons, Daughters, and Intergenerational Support in 
Taiwan." American Journal of Sociology 99(4): 1010-41. 
Lillard, L. A. and R. J. Willis (1997). "Motives for Intergenerational Transfers: Evidence 
from Malaysia." Demography 34(1): 115-34.   17 
Mason, A. (2001a). Population and Economic Growth in East Asia. Population Change 
and Economic Development in East Asia: Challenges Met, Opportunities Seized. 
A. Mason. Stanford, Stanford University Press: 1-30. 
Mason, A. (2001b). Population Change and Economic Development in East Asia: 
Challenges Met, Opportunities Seized. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
Mason, A. and R. Lee (2004). Reform and Support Systems for the Elderly in Developing 
Countries: Capturing the Second Demographic Dividend. International Seminar on 
the Demographic Window and Healthy Aging: Socioeconomic Challenges and 
Opportunities, China Centre for Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing. 
Preston, S. H. (1984). "Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for America's 
Dependents." Demography 21(4): 435-457. 
Razin, A., E. Sadka, et al. (2002). "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare 
State." Journal of Political Economy 110(4): 900-918. 
Samuelson, P. (1958). "An Exact Consumption Loan Model of Interest with or without the 
Social Contrivance of Money." Journal of Political Economy 66: 467-82. 
Willis, R. J. (1980). The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Population Growth. 
Demographic Behavior: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Decision-making. T. 
Burch. Boulder, Westview Press: 43-69. 
 Children (g1) Workers (g2) Pensioners (g3)
lnearn(a,t) 0.691 0.775 0.731
(0.025) (0.025) (0.043)
r1(g1/g2) 0.442 0.291 0.293
(0.016) (0.016) (0.028)
r2(g3/g2) 0.083 0.137 0.594
(0.038) (0.047) (0.068)
n(a-g,t) -0.096 -0.006 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
n(a+g,t) -0.573 -0.712 -0.132
(0.072) (0.077) (0.104)
N(t) population -0.917 -0.928 -0.830
(0.047) (0.049) (0.090)
R2 0.987 0.988 0.976
Number of obs. 546 546 546






Age 5 9.8% -11.4% -1.6% 51.7% 50.1% 277% 18.1%
Age 20 3.0% -8.4% -5.4% 51.7% 46.4% 222% 20.9%
Age 35 0.7% -14.4% -13.7% 52.2% 38.5% 279% 13.8%
Age 50 0.2% -10.5% -10.3% 52.2% 41.9% 263% 15.9%
Age 65 -1.6% -2.5% -4.1% 48.3% 44.1% 254% 17.4%
Table 2. Counterfactual analysis of effects of age structure on per capita income, earnings 





dividend (D/E)Birth cohort 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030
1891-1900 11.96
1901-1910 12.05 12.34
1911-1920 12.03 12.37 12.53
1921-1930 12.15 12.35 12.57 12.66
1931-1940 12.26 12.48 12.55 12.62 12.52
1941-1950 12.14 12.57 12.67 12.60 12.47
1951-1960 12.10 12.48 12.80 12.70 12.40
1961-1970 12.04 12.44 12.72 12.85 12.52
1971-1980 11.94 12.38 12.64 12.72 12.64
1981-1990 12.08 12.36 12.66 12.59 12.27
1991-2000 12.38 12.61 12.73 12.31
2001-2010 12.62 12.63 12.54
2011-2020 12.39 12.24
2021-2030 12.07
Table 3. Counterfactual analysis of the effects of age and year of birth on ln of 
per capita income 
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